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A FRAMEWORK FOR REPARATIONS 
CLAIMS 
KEITH N. HYLTON* 
Abstract: These remarks. prepared for the Boston College Third H'lJrld Law 
Journal Reparations Symposium. compare the goals and viability of 
reparations claims as tort suits. I contrast two approaches obsened in 
the claims: a "doing justice" model, which involyes seeking compen-
satiOlI in important cases of uncorrected or uncompensated injustice, 
and a "social welfare" model that seeks to change the distribution of 
wealth. Claims under the first category are far more consistent with tort 
doctrine and likely to meet their goals than social welfare-based claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
I am aware of two extant legal claims for reparations, the FarmeT-
Paellmann v. FleetBoston1 case in New York and now the claim for com-
pensation in Tulsa, Oklahoma.2 The FlcetBoston complaint seeks com-
pensatory damages, punitive damages, restitution, and an accounting 
of profits from American slavery. The Tulsa complaint seeks compensa-
tion for victims whose relatives were killed and property destroyed by 
angry white mobs that rioted though Tulsa's black community in 1921.3 
My aim in this article is to compare different reparations claims 
in terms of their goals and viability as tort suits. I con trast two ap-
proaches observed in the claims: a "social welfare" model and a "do-
ing justice" model. Part I of this article highlights the distinctions be-
tween these two approaches. Part II analyzes the potential of the 
social welfare model by drawing upon statistical data measuring rela-
* Professor of Law and Paul]. Liacos Scholar in Law, Boston Uniyersitv School of Law; 
Boston, MA, 02215; knhylton@bu.edu. This paper was prepared for a conference on repa-
rations at Boston College Law School, l\Iar. 14,2003. 
1 Sec generally Complaint & JUry Trial Demand, Farmer-Paellmann y. FleetBoston Fin. 
Corp. (E.D.N.l: 2002) (No.02-CV-1862). 
2 See Lyle Denniston, Lawyers Hope Tulsa Case Can Lay Foundation fOI' lIfol'e Claims, Bos-
TON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at A16. 
3 See id. (describing Professor Charles Ogletree's leadership of team that drafted com-
plaint seeking compensation in Tulsa case); Tatsha Robertson, Qucst fOI' Findication: SUl'vi-
VOl'S of 1921 Tulsa Race Riots Hail Suit fOI' Reparations, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 26, 2003, at AI. 
Sec gencrally ALFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 
1921 (2002) (proyiding full historical treatment). 
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tive poverty rates among black and white families in the United States. 
Parts III and IV analyze the potential of both the social welfare model 
and the justice model by setting up a tort-based framework in which 
to determine the relative likelihood that these claims will prevail in 
court. I conclude that reparations claims under the justice model are 
far more consistent with tort doctrine and likely to meet their goals 
than the social-welfare-based claims. 
1. Two ApPROACHES TO REPARATIONS CLAn,ls:JUSTICE 
VERSUS SOCIAL WELFARE 
Although both the FleetBostoll and Tulsa complaints have been de-
scribed as reparations claims, there are significant differences between 
them. They reflect two distinct and in some ways conflicting policies 
behind reparations litigation. One approach is driven in large part by 
social welfare and distributional goals. The other approach is based on 
a desire to correct historical injustices; simply to "do justice."4 
The justice approach views reparations lawsuits as efforts to iden-
tify uncorrected or uncompensated cases of injustice, and to seek 
"correction" in the Aristotelian sense of returning the parties to posi-
tions roughly similar to the pre-injury setting. This involves identifYing 
particular individuals or entities that committed bad acts and particu-
lar victims who were injured. Such correction also requires specifying 
the precise acts that led to injury, and the sums necessary to compen-
sate victims for the injuries. The Tulsa complaint fits this description. 
The lawyers who filed the complaint have rounded up individuals 
whose property was destroyed and whose relatives were killed or in-
jured during the Tulsa riots. Another example under this category is 
the class action suit brought against the federal government in 1973 
for the Tuskegee syphilis experiment.5 Yet another example is the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, which provides compensation for Japanese 
4 This view of reparations claims brings them within the class of recent criminal trials 
of former Klansman for murders committed in the 1960s. See Rick Bragg, Fonner Klansman 
Is Found Guilty of 1966 Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003, at A12 (reporting case of Ernest 
Avants, a former Klansman found guilty by a jury, after only three hours of deliberation, 
for the murder of Ben Chester White); Guilty Verdict in Church BomiJing Trial, Online News-
Hour, at http://www.pbs.org/newshour / engenda_preview /updates/birmingham_05-02-
22.html (May 22, 2002) (describing conviction of former Klansman Bobby Frank Cherry 
for murder offour girls in 1963 bombing of Sixteenth Street Baptist Church). 
5 Starting in the 1930s, 399 syphilitic men signed up for free medical care from the 
U.S. Public Health Service. They were never told that they had syphilis, only that they had 
"bad blood." See Sour Legacy of Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment Lingers, CNN Interactive, at http:/ 
hvww.cnn.com/HEALTH/9705/16/nfm.tuskegee/ (May 16,1997). 
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Americans held in internment camps during \IVorld War 11.6 The stat-
ute compensates only direct victims-the individuals who were held in 
internment camps. 
In contrast to the justice approach, the social welfare approach 
reflected in the FleetBoston complaint does not seek to do justice in any 
discrete case, but rather, aims for a significant redistribution of 
wealth. The complaint names several existing corporations as defen-
dants, such as FleetBoston (a bank) and CSX (a railroad), including a 
reference to one thousand "Corporate Does" as additional defen-
dants.7 So many businesses had a hand in slavery that the complaint 
could just as well refer to ten thousand Corporate Does. The plaintiff, 
Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, sues on "behalf of herself and all other 
persons similarly situated"-in other words, on behalf of all African 
1'linericans whose ancestors were held as slaves in this country.s 
This brief description of the Tulsa and FleetBoston complaints 
should be sufficient to illustrate the differences between the social 
welfare and justice approaches. There is nothing controversial about 
doing justice; most lawsuits claim to have that principle at their core. 
The social welfare approach, however, is unusual in litigation. At the 
heart of the FleetBostoll suit is a belief that reparations litigation will 
compensate or correct for years and years of inattention, or in-
sufficient attention, to the welfare of African Americans. In short, 
proponents hope that FleetBoston-like lawsuits will force through the 
kind of broad redistribution of resources toward poor black citizens 
that might never be achieved through the political process. 
The social welfare approach shares much in common with the re-
cent wave of tobacco litigation and the lawsuits against gun companies. 
The tobacco litigation, specifically the "Master Settlement Agree-ment" 
between tobacco companies and litigating states, led to a large-scale 
redistribution from cigarette manufacturers and their customers to 
other groups in society.9 That redistribution compensates society for 
some of the "externalities" imposed by the cigarette industry and helps 
to shrink its overall size. Many have argued that such a massive redistri-
bution is socially desirable, and that Congress or state legistlatures 
650 U .S.c. app. § 1989 (2000). 
7 Complaint & Jury Trial Demand at 1, FaTlIIC1"-Pacllmall1/ (No. 02-CV-1862). 
8 See id. 
9 See generally DAVID l\f. CUTLER ET AL., How GOOD A DEAL WAS THE TOBACCO SE1~ 
TLEMENT? ASSESSING PAYMENTS TO l\[ASSACilUSETTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
"'orking Paper No. 7747, 2000) (assessing payments to Massachusetts in tobacco settle-
ment of 1998), (/l}{lilable at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=233750. 
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would have failed to achieve a similar result because tobacco companies 
circulate enough money throughout government to block any 
significant move toward greater regulation or taxation. In the same 
sense, proponents of FleetBoston-like reparations claims believe that 
significant redistribution toward groups that make up America's un-
derc'lass will not be achieved through legislative action. Thus, repara-
tions proponents have turned toward the courts. 
II. STATISTICS AND THE SOCIAL WELFARE ApPROACH 
Perhaps the best way to get a sense of the potential of the social wel-
fare approach is to start with a review of where things stand in terms of 
relative welfare levels. Table 1 shows the percentage of families living be-
low the poverty line in the United States for the years 1959 to 1999. The 
first two columns in the table compare poverty rates for black and white 
families, including those not married (female-headed households). The 
last two columns compare poverty rates for married families. 
The statistics show that the poverty rate among black families fell 
from nearly 50% in 1959 to 28% in 1969. It held steady at that level 
for the next twenty years. The most recent year in Table 1, 1999, 
shows the poverty rate for black families at 22%, a substantial decline 
relative to the stagnation of the previous three decades. 
White families appear to have made substantial progress from 1959 
to 1969; their poverty rate dropped from 15% to 8% during that pe-
riod. After 1969, white families made inconsistent progress for the next 
twenty years. While the statistics for white families do not show the same 
stagnation seen in the numbers for black families, the poverty rate at 
the end of 1989 is the same as it was at the end of 1969. In 1999, we see 
a significant drop in the white poverty rate down to almost 7%. 
Table 1: Families Below Poverty Line in the United States lO 
% of Families % of Families % of Families % of Families 
Year White Black White Married Black Married 
1959 15,2 48.1 
1969 7.7 27.9 
1979 6.9 27.8 4.7 13.2 
1989 7.8 27.8 5.0 11.8 
1999 7.3 21.9 4.4 7.1 
10 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES (1999), at http://www.censlls. 
gOY /hhes/poverty /histprov /histpov4.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2003). 
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Table 1 suggests a pessimistic outlook for the potential of social 
welfare-based reparations litigation. The most aggressive period of re-
distributional policy implemented by the federal government, 1969 to 
1989,11 coincides with roughly twenty years of stagnation in the poverty 
rate for black families. For those who believe in the transformational 
potential of FleetBoston-like lawsuits, this is a disappointing fact. 
Census data on poverty rates for married families became avail-
able much later, and so Table 1 shows figures only from 1979 to 1999. 
These data suggest some interesting observations. For both races, the 
poverty rates are lower within the population of married families. The 
decline appears to be much greater for black families, however. The 
ratio of white married to general family pover!)' rates runs from a 
high of 68% in 1979 to 60% in 1999. The ratio of black married to 
general family poverty runs from 47% in 1979 to 32% in 1999. 
The relative poverty rates of married families to general families 
suggest that most of the difference between black and white family 
pover!)' rates can be explained by family structure-specifically, the 
low rate of marriage among black families below the poverty line. In-
deed, the 1999 Census data on poverty rates suggest that family struc-
ture has a significant influence on wealth. In 1999, the marriage rate 
among white families below the poverty line was 82%.12 The marriage 
rate among black families below the poverty line was 48%.13 The pov-
erty rate among non-married white families was 20%.14 The poverty 
rate among non-married black families was 36%.15 If black families 
below the poverty line had the same marriage rate as white families 
below the poverty line in 1999, the general black poverty rate would 
be 12.3%,16 nearly half the 22% level reported for that year. 
11 Admittedly, the Civil Rights and Great Society legislation began during the mid-
1960s, but it is unlikely that they had much of an impact on relative wealth levels by 1969. 
Thus, the 1969-1989 period covered by the Census data probably provides a reliable 
measure of the effects of redistributional policies, 
12 This is the ratio of the number of married-couple white families in the 1999 Censlls 
sample, 48.794, to the number of white families in the sample, 60,256, U.S. CENSUS Bu-
REAU, supra note 10. 
13 This is the ratio of the number of married-couple black families in the 1999 Census 
sample, 4,144, to the number of black families in the sample, 8,664. Sec id. 
14 I found this by using the relationship 7.3 = (1-.82)x+ (.82)4.4, where x is the poverty 
rate among non-married white families in 1999. 
15 I fOllnd this by using the relationship 21.9 = (1-.48)y+ (.48)7.1, where y is the poverty 
rate among non-married black families in 1999. 
16lf poor blacks had the same marriage rate as poor whites in 1999, the overall poverty 
rate would be given by (1-.82)36 + (.82) 7.1 = 12.3. 
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That the black poverty rate appears to be so largely influenced by 
family structure has to be considered a discouraging piece of informa-
tion for proponents of the social welfare model of reparations litiga-
tion. Reparations lawsuits simply cannot do much to change the mar-
riage rate in poor black families. 
Perhaps I have been unfair in my description of the social welfare 
model. The goal of the FleetBoston suit may be to use the money col-
lected from defendants to build social institutions that foster family 
stability, enhancement of human capital, and the development of 
businesses. If so, the social welfare based litigation may indeed lead to 
a substantial drop in the black poverty rate. But this is a purely speCll-
lative argument. There would be a substantial lag between payout and 
results if the real aim of the FleetBoston suit were to invest in the devel-
opment of social capital. Also, there is nothing in the FleetBoston com-
plaint that would lead one to believe that the aim of the lawsuit is to 
fund social capital development. 
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR CLAHI.fS 
Two features distinguish reparations claims from ordinary, run-
of-the-mill tort lawsuits. One is a credible assertion by the plaintiffs 
that they faced an insurmountable legal barrier in the past preventing 
them from seeking a remedy in the courts at the time of the initial 
injury. This is true of both the Tulsa and FleetBoston complaints. Lynch 
mobs initiated the Tulsa riots, claiming to be searching for a black 
man accused of assaulting a white woman. In that period, when racist 
lynchings were common, black residents of Tulsa would have ration-
ally assumed that no court would seriously consider a lawsuit seeking 
compensation for injuries caused by a lynch mob. In the FleetBostoll 
complaint, the claim of a legal barrier is more credible: slavery was 
formally sanctioned by law until its abolition in 1865. 
The second distinguishing feature of reparations claims is passage 
of time; the claims are typically brought long after relevant tort and 
criminal statutes of limitations have passed. The passage of time prob-
lem presents several legal difficulties. First, there is the problem of 
identification. The identities of the victims and injurers are hard to de-
termine,17 though the importance of this problem varies with the type 
17 See Marc Galanter, Righting Old Wrongs, in BREAKING THE CYCLES OF HATRED 10i, 
112-16 (Marth Minow ed. 2002) (discussing the problem of identification); Alfred L. Bro-
phy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems ill Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.V. ANN. SUR\,. N.1. 
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of claim. The Tulsa complaint involves identifiable victims. The injur-
ers in the Tulsa case are to some extent identifiable. Some of the van-
dals and killers are probably still alive. perhaps living quietly in Tulsa. 
Further, if you accept plaintiffs' claims that the city and state govern-
ments are partially responsible, which seems plausible when a group 
launches a pogrom and goes unpunished by the state, then those enti-
ties still exist and can be sued. Nevertheless, the local and state gov-
ernments have surely changed since the days of the Tulsa riots. Al-
though they are formally the same entities that were in existence at 
the time of the riots, they are vastly different from their predecessor 
regimes in terms of the characteristics relevant to the lawsuit. 
Identification is a much more serious problem in the FleetBoston 
case. The named corporate defendants had no direct hand in the 
slavery business; they are successors to businesses that once had a 
hand in slavery. This raises the same problem we observe in the Tulsa 
case but in a more severe form. While the defendants in Tulsa are 
formally the same entities that were in existence at the time of the 
riots, though their characters have changed, the defendants in Fleet-
Boston are not even formally the same entities. Moreover, the succes-
sor corporations named as defendants in FleetBoston probably bear lit-
tle resemblance to their predecessor firms. Given that successor firms 
are generally not liable for the torts of predecessor firms, this is a po-
tentially important obstacle to plaintiffs.l8 Successorship law makes 
exceptions, forcing successors to assume the liabilities of predecessors 
in special cases in which the Sllccessor has promised to assume those 
liabilities or, at the least, has continued the same operations.19 But the 
Sllccessors in this case probably do not fall into either exception. 
Perhaps the more troubling identification problem in FleetBoston 
is that it appears to be a matter of chance that some corporations have 
been identified as successors.20 One assumes there were many more 
L. 497. 503-05 (2003) (same); l\fariJ. l\iatsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies 
and Rcj)(lTations, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 323, 374-80 (1987) (same). 
18 Sec Polius ,'. Clark Equip. Co., 802 F.2d 75, 83 (3d Cir. 1986) ("The imposition of 
successor liability on a purchasing company long after the transfer of assets defeats the 
legitimate expectations the parties held during negotiations and sale."). 
19 Sec Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 308-09 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(recognizing exceptions to the general rule of nonliability). 
20 This version of the identification problem-inability to get substantially all of the re-
sponsible injurers in court-has emerged as a barrier to market share liability claims. See, 
c.g., Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A,2d 169, 175 (Pa. 1997) (rejecting market share 
liability claim in case of lOO-plus year-old house). Admittedly, the problem is different in 
the sla"ery reparations context. In ShijJ1vorth, the fact that the plaintiff could not be sure 
that he had joined the responsible defendant or defendants was a major flaw. [d. at 174. 
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firms involved in slavery than the number that appear as named de-
fendants on the FleetBoston complaint. Suppose the named defendants 
(including the Corporate Does) were all held liable. Should their li-
ability be capped, as in the market share liability cases, by their degree 
of responsibility in creating the harm?21 
The general identification problem on the part of plaintiffs in 
the FleetBoston case is particularly severe. This is a well-known problem, 
so I will not tax the reader with a detailed account. Who are the de-
scendants of the victims of slavery? What should be done about Af'ri-
can Americans who cannot trace an unbroken blood line through 
other descendants of slaves? Should an Mrican-American multimil-
lionaire who can trace an unbroken blood line to slavery be consid-
ered within the plaintiff class? 
The second problem connected to the passage of time is de-
scribed as "causation" or "proximate cause" in the law. The law re-
quires proof of a causal link between the plaintiff's injury claim and 
the defendant's breach of the legal standard. I have explored this 
problem elsewhere.22 For now, it should be enough to say that it will 
not be easy to prove that a particular plaintiff's position today is the 
direct result of slavery several generations ago. 
The third problem connected to the passage of time is that of 
prescription of legal rights. I refer to statutes of limitation. They exist in 
part because of the reasons mentioned above-identification and 
causation, both of which become difficult to prove as time passes. 
They also exist because the deterrent effect of the law is likely to be 
weak, relative to the cost of its implementation, as more time passes 
between initial injury and enforcement of the law. 
IV. ApPLYING THE FRAMEWORK 
Looking at the identification problem alone, we can classifY repa-
rations complaints according to the scheme in Figure 1 below. The 
Plaintiffs in the FleetBoston case are suing the successors of proper defendants, but their 
levels of responsibility for harms to the plain tiff class differ greatly. Complain t & Jury Trial 
Demand at 8-9, Farmer-Paellmann (No. 02-CV-1862). In addition, in most cases the link, in 
terms of finances or business practices, between the successor and its pre-1865 predecessor 
is tenuous. 
21 See City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 994 F.2d 112, 125-27 (discussing 
judicial responses to market share liability). 
22 See KEITH N. HYLTON, SLAVERY AND TORT LAW 46-51, (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law, 
Working Paper No. 03-02, 2003, Soc. Science Research Network Elec. Paper Collection) 
(exploring the problem of causation and proximate cause), at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
paper.taf?abstract_id=374200. 
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columns describe categories of identifiable and non-identifiable 111-
jurers. The rows describe categories of identifiable and non-ident-
ifiable victims. So, for example, the first cell of Figure 1 contains 
complaints involving identifiable injurers and victims. 
Under the category of identifiable injurers, I have included cases 
involving injurers who were actively responsible for the harms im-
posed on victims. For example, the Tuskegee syphilis experiments in-
volved identifiable government departments.23 I put the Tulsa com-
plaint in the non-identifiable category because the only responsible 
parties identified so far are the local governments, who were passive. 
Holocaust reparations claims belong in both the identifiable and 
non-identifiable injurer categories. Claims against the German gov-
ernment or against Swiss banks involve identifiable injurers who were 
actively responsible, though again in the form of successor corpora-
tions. Holocaust claims also involve a potentially large number of pas-
sively responsible actors, which are difficult to identify. For example, 
claims against manufacturers for selling technology or items that 
aided the Nazi regime probably could be asserted against an indeter-
minable number of corporations. And then there is the Goldhagen 
thesis, that most ordinary Germans were willing accomplices,24 which 
creates an even larger identification issue. 
The only unexplained part of Figure 1 involves identifiable de-
fendants and non-identifiable plaintiffs. The claims to comnmnalland 
by American Indians or Australian Aborigines are representative of 
this type of reparations claim. The actively responsible injurer is easy 
to identifY. The victims, descendants of the initial group of dispos-
sessed natives, are sometimes difficult to identify. Indeed, the issues 
are equivalent to the ones that arise in determining where to group 
the plaintiff class in the FleetBoston case. 
Figure 1 
rr/~ Identifiable Injurers Non-identifiable Injurers 
Iden tifiable Tuskegee. Japanese in ternmen t, Tulsa (passive theory), 
Victims Holocaust, Tulsa (conspiracy theory) Holocaust 
Non-iden tifiable Vic- Coml11unalland claims (in United Fleet 
tims States, Australia) Boston 
23 In December 1974, the class action suit was settled for roughly $10 million, which 
provided $37,500 to each of the SHrviYi.llg subjects of the study and smaller amollnts to 
other victims. Galanter, supra note 17. at 124 n.2. 
24 See gC/lcrally DANIEL JONAH (;OLDHAGEN, HITLER'S 'VILUNG EXECUTIONERS: ORDI-
NARY GERMANS 8.: TilE HOLOCAUST (1996). 
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My point in setting up this framework is to differentiate the types 
of reparations claims in terms of their likelihood of prevailing in 
court. The ability to identifY parties is a basic prerequisite for any tort 
suit seeking compensation for injuries. A tort plaintiff is unlikely to 
collect damages if a court cannot be relatively sure that the defendant 
he or she is suing is really the one who caused the plaintiffs injury; 
the same is true if the court cannot be sure that the plaintiff is really 
the one who suffered an injury. The tort cases put this problem under 
the general category of "factual causation." The oldest and most 
widely accepted solution to the identification problem appeared in 
Summers v. Tiee, where the court shifted the burden of proof to two 
hunters who both shot at the plaintiff at the same time, and only one 
of them wounded the plaintiff.25 
In terms of identification, the Tuskegee case falls within the 
strongest category of claims because both the victims and the actively 
responsible injurers were identified. The Tulsa claim is almost as 
strong, though its closeness to the Tuskegee case depends on the 
plaintiffs' theory of liability. If the plaintiffs assert and produce 
sufficient evidence to prove that the local and state government de-
fendants acted in conspiracy with leaders of the rioting mob, then the 
Tulsa claim is essentially equivalent to the Tuskegee case.26 If, how-
ever, the plaintiffs can show only that the local and state governments 
were negligent, in the passive sense of not doing enough to prevent 
the harm or punish the injurers, then the Tulsa claim is weaker than 
the Tuskegee case because the Tulsa defendants would not be actively 
responsible injurers. Still, even under this theory, it is arguably too 
strict to put the Tulsa claim in the category of non-identifiable defen-
dants. In terms of identification, the Tulsa complaint is much closer 
to the Tuskegee case than to the FleetBoston claim. 
Though the Tulsa complaint is relatively close to the Tuskegee 
case on identification grounds, and therefore a relatively strong case 
25 See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948). 
26 See First Amended Complaint at 7-8, Alexander v. Governor of State of Oklahoma 
(N.D. Okla. 2003) (No. 03-CV-133) ("Defendants the GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF 
OKLAHOMA and the CITY OF TULSA conspired together and acted in concert with one 
another throughout and after the Riot. The Defendants called out local units of the State 
National Guard and deputized white citizens of Tulsa, Oklahoma (Tulsa'), who, acting 
under color of state law, participated as members of a white mob in a race Riot that was 
designed to, and did in fact, brutalize and terrorize the African American residents of the 
Greenwood District."). 
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on that score, the other barriers connected to the passage of time (re-
viewed above) remain and still must be surmounted. The proximate 
causation problem is not a serious obstacle. This is not to say that 
proximate cause issues are irrelevant-they clearly are relevant. Nev-
ertheless, the proximate cause objections appear to be weak. 
What kind of proximate cause defense could be asserted in the 
Tulsa case? There is a basic rule from the constitutional tort cases, 
similar to the general tort rule on rescue, that a government depart-
ment does not have a duty to rescue a particular citizen from private 
harm. The doctrine can be traced to DeShaney v. Winnebago County De-
partment of Social Services,27 in which the Supreme Court rejected the 
constitutional tort claim brought against a county social services de-
partment for failing to intervene to protect a child from being sav-
agely beaten by his father. 28 The governments in the Tulsa case could 
try to cast the lawsuit as a rescue claim, and shield themselves with this 
version of the no-duty rule. Of course, this defense is preposterous. 
The plaintiffs are claiming that there was a duty to prevent the harm 
alld to punish the injurers, neither of which appears to have happened. 
And although I am not familiar with the case law on this issue, I would 
think a police force does have a duty to prevent a highly foreseeable 
crime. The old practice of southern police forces to be "gone fishin" 
at just the time that a racist mob set out to lynch someone should be 
considered actionable negligence at least. 
Since the identification and proximate cause questions are rela-
tively simple and fall in favor of the plaintiffs in the Tulsa complaint, 
the only remaining question is whether the claim should be barred on 
prescription grounds, i.e., on the passage of relevant statutes of limita-
tion. This is a difficult question. On the one hand, prescription rules 
serve important purposes. They bar old claims brought after actively 
responsible actors and witnesses have moved or passed away and evi-
dellCe has disappeared and grown stale. On the other hanel, this is a 
case in which plaintiffs have a credible claim that they were effectively 
barred from suing for compensation within the period of the statutes 
of limitation. The local police forces and courts would not have coop-
erated with any effort to sue for compensation in 1921. The litigants 
would have been left to the mercy of the same lynch mob that con-
ducted the initial riot. 
27 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
28Id. at 201-02. 
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Clearly there was a period, though it is difficult to say how long, 
in which any claim for compensation would have been difficult to 
bring and most likely unsuccessful. The Tulsa claim should not have 
been barred over this period, which implies that the statutes of limita-
tion should have been tolled. The question is whether that period 
should be considered so long that a suit for compensation brought 
today should not be barred by the prescription rules. The case boils 
down to this simple issue. It would seem harsh for a court to deny 
compensation on such a narrow ground, especially in view of the simi-
larities between the Tulsa and Tuskegee claims. Nevertheless, I am not 
aware of any court tolling a statute of limitations because the plaintiffs 
rationally discounted the likelihood of a successful suit. 
As it happens, the Tulsa plaintiffs are arguing that a successful law-
suit would have been exceedingly difficult until the year 2001, when a 
special commission formed by the st.:'lte of Oklahoma presented a more 
or less full account of what happened during the 1921 riot.29 This 
should be viewed as an effort to fall within the "discovery" basis for toll-
ing a statute oflimitations. Under the discovery rule, a statute of limit a-
tions is tolled until the plaintiff discovers his injury-as in the case of a 
medical malpractice victim who discovers that a sponge has been left 
inside him months after the surgeon's negligent act. 30 The Tulsa plain-
tiffs can be understood as arguing that there was not enough informa-
tion about the cause of the 1921 riot to bring a successful suit until the 
publication of the 2001 report. To be sure, this is not the same as the 
traditional discovery argument, but it is close. 
This is a plausible justification for tolling the statute of limitations 
only because of the special circumstances of the Tulsa case. Lawsuits 
brought by victims soon after the riots were met with hostility in the 
local courts and government offices and routinely were dismissed. 31 
Official accounts of the riots were deliberately vague and obfuscated 
the chain of causation and responsibility.32 In addition, many of the 
victims eventually moved on, choosing to build their lives again in a 
new environment rather than staying behind to regain what was lost. 
Given the enormous cost of finding victims, persuading them to 
29 First Amended Complaint at 18, A.lexander (No. 03-CV-133). "The legislature of the 
State of Oklahoma adopted many of the Commission's findings by statute in 2001." ld. at 
20. 
30 See, e.g., Dayv. Meek, 976 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1999). 
31 First Amended Complant at 19-20, 19 11.20, lliexander (No. 03-CV-133) (citing 
BROPHY, supra note 3, at 95-97). 
32 ld. at 20-21,164. 
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prosecute a claim, and proving responsibility, a highly plausible case 
can be made that the Tulsa suit was not a feasible claim for a private 
lawyer to pursue until the state's own investigation had set out the 
facts on causation and responsibility. 
If this statute of limitations question is resolved in favor of plaintiffs 
in the Tulsa case, will the FlcetBostoli complaint appear to be stronger? 
Perhaps, but the distance between the FlcctBoston and Tulsa claims is con-
siderably further than that between the Tulsa and Tuskegee claims. 
CONCLUSION 
When thinking about reparations claims, one should avoid the 
mistake of viewing them as monolithic, having the same difficulties in 
terms of identification of plaintiffs, causation, and prescription of le-
gal rights. In fact, reparations claims vary along many legal dimen-
sions, creating a rich array in terms of their consistency with settled 
law. This paper has set out a framework for evaluating the likelihood 
that these claims will prevail in court, primarily in the hope that it 
might help clarifY the issues in debates over the wisdom of reparations 
litigation. 

